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Physical and Emotional States as Memory-relevant 
Factors: Cognitive Monitoring by Young Children 
Donald s. Hayes, L. Carol Scott, 
Bruce E. Chemelski, and Janelle Johnson 
University of M aine 
The Flavell (1981) model of cognitive monitoring and melamnemonic develop-
ment was tested by fou r experiments conducted to determine whether young 
children (a) recognize that mood, fatigue, and fear are variables that in fluence 
learn ing, and (b) se lf-monitor their own inte rnal states and adjust their study be-
havior when tired or sad. In Experiment 1, preschoolers viewed drawings of the 
sa me child studying in djffe re nt physica l o r e motional stales and judged which 
context represented easier learning. Most children viewed both mood and fa-
tigue as memory relevant factors, correct ly indicating that studying is easier 
when one is happy or alert. In Experiments 2 through 4, happiness or sadness 
and fatigue or nonfatigue were evoked in preschoolers, who then scheduled a 
se lf· learning session. Preschoolers more frequently delayed their own learning 
when sad or tired, suggesting cognitive monitoring of interna l states in a learning 
context. 
Cognitive monitoring has been recognized as an important pro-
cess in many domains of human behavior. For example, in his model 
of metacognitive deve lopment, Flavell (1981 ) assumed that monitor-
ing of internal experiences provides one of several mechanisms for 
cognitive growth. Likewise, linguists (e.g. , Garvey, 1984) have sug-
gested that monitoring plays an important role in the verbal and social 
development of young children. 
Although monitoring is assumed to be of theoretical importance, 
the full range of contexts in which it occurs in young children is far 
from established. Research on this issue, however, has demonstrated 
that preschool and kindergarten children monitor comprehension dif-
ficulties during play in familiar settings {Revelle, Wellman, & Karaben-
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ick, 1985; 5hultz & Cloghesy, 1981 ) and during referential communi-
cat ion (Bearison & Levey, 1977; Patterson, Cosgrove, & O 'Brien, 
1980). Likewise, monitoring has been shown to occur w ithin certain 
memory paradigms, as indicated by children reporting feeling-of-
knowing experiences (Cultice, Sommerville, & Wellman, 1983; W ell -
man, 1977) or terminating search endeavors (Kobasigawa, 1983). Al-
ternately, deficiencies in the process have been reported when young 
children are required to monitor the effectiveness of various learning 
strategies (Bisanz, Vesonder, & Voss, 1978; M asur, Mcintyre, & Flav-
ell, 1973) or recognize verbal ambiguity in unfamiliar situations (Mark-
man, 1977). Although these findings suggest that even 3-year-old 
children monitor (Revelle et aI. , 1985), researchers have overlooked 
two important contexts in which the process may also occur: moni-
toring of one's emotional and physica l states. 
Within the rea lm of learning and memory, it is well establi shed 
that certain physical and emotional states affect children's behavior. 
For example, Hill (1972) reported a series of studies in which high 
levels of fear and anxiety retarded the rate at which children acq uired 
new information. Likewise, Masters, Barden, and Ford (1979) found 
young children 's level of retention to be lower when subjects were in 
a negative rather than positive mood. Finally, research on massed 
practice has demonstrated that fatigue interferes with the establish-
ment of new associations in seria l and paired-associate learning (Dou-
sa jh, 1957; Underwood, 1961). 
Surprisingly little is known, however, about the degree to which 
young children are aware of these effects or can monitor their own in-
ternal states and adjust activities to compensate for the negative im-
pact each may have on behavior. In studi es of metamemory, re-
searchers (Wellman, 1977, 1978; Yussen & Bird, 1979) have verified 
that preschool children view certain task factors (e.g., noise or 
amount to learn) as memory-relevant va riables. But to our knowl-
edge, no one has studied the person variables (Flavell, 1981) of fa-
tigue, mood, or fear/ anxiety. Perhaps the closest investigation of this 
type was reported by Taylor and Harris (1983). who found that 7-
yea r-o ld children believe that their own happy experiences will be 
easier to remember than sad ones. This finding, however, does not 
demonstrate that younger children rea li ze that fear, fatigue, or sad-
ness generally will retard learning in a variety of situations. Because of 
the lack of research in thi s area, and because of the theoretica l impor-
tance that monitoring is assumed to play in metacognitive develop-
ment (Flave ll, 1981), a series of studies were conducted to learn more 
about its operation in conjunction with va rious physical and emo-
ti onal states. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
The first experiment was des igned to determine whether young 
children manifest metacognitive awareness that mood, fatigue, and 
fear/ anxiety are all factors which influence memory. In particular, we 
w ished to assess whether they recognize that memorization is more 
di fficult when one is sad, afraid, or tired. Because previous research 
(Wellman, 1977, 1978) has demonstrated that awareness of the rela-
tion between memorization and certain task variables (e.g., distrac-
tion or amount to learn) is established by 3 to 4 years of age, a pre-
school sample was selected for use in this study. 
Method 
Task and pretesting. As adapted from Wellman (1977), the ma-
jor task involved presenting pairs of line drawings of the same child 
studying in contexts that di ffered in terms of only one dimension. 
Each subject then judged which situation wi thin the pair was "eas-
ier," or whether the depicted situations were the "same" in difficulty. 
Thus, to be included in the sample, children first had to demonstrate 
comprehension of the concepts same and easier during two pretest -
ing trials. These trials were nearly identical to those used by Wellman 
(1977). They involved asking potential subjects to judge whether it 
was easier for a child, depicted throwing a ball , to hit a large than 
small target; but the same in diff iculty to hit a constant size target. 
Subjects. Of 29 children between 3 and 5 years of age who 
were pretested, 24 children (mean CA = 49.2 months, SO = 8.3 
months) comprehended both pretesting concepts and served as sub-
jects. All children were enrolled in the Child Study Center at the Uni-
versity of Maine. 
Tes ting procedures. Immediately following pretesting, seven 
test trials were administered in one of two random orders, with two 
pictures presented on each trial. The drawings were identical w ithin a 
pair, except for one difference specific to the fo llowing dimensions: 
mood (sad vs. happy facial expression), fa tigue (tired vs. alert body 
posture and facial expression), fear (anxious vs. ca lm expression and 
body posture), distraction (quiet vs. noisy study conditions), amount 
(seven vs. two study pictures), weight (fat vs. thin child studying), and 
clothing (striped vs. polka-dotted shirt). The latter four dimensions 
were included to replicate and provide continuity wi th prior research 
of th is type (Wellman, 1977, 1978). 
A narration describing the key d ifference between the pictures 
comprising each pair accompanied the drawings. The experimenter 
also pointed to the major difference between the pictures as they 
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Table 1. Number of Children Choosing Easier Learning Context: Experiment 1 
Dimension Level Chosen as Easier Same in Difficulty 
M ood Happy 17 Sad 7 0 
Fatigue Tired 4 Alert 19 1 
Fear Afra id 8 Calm 9 7 
Amount Fe w 17 Many 7 0 
Distraction Q uiet 19 Noisy 3 2 
Clothing Striped 6 Polka-Dot 7 11 
W eight Thin I S Fal 6 3 
were described verbally. Subjects were reminded on each trial that 
the depicted child was trying " to learn the names of these pictures so 
he or she can remember them later. " The terms calm and alert were 
clarified with the phrases not afraid and no t tired. Children indicated 
their choices by either stating that the pictures were the same in diff i-
culty or by pointing to the easier situation, and then they were asked 
to explain their choices immediately after they made each selection. 
Results and Discussion 
For each dimension, children could pick one item as eas ier, or 
implici tly assert the fac tor to be irrelevant by judging both situati ons 
to be the same in d ifficulty. The distribution of children's choices for 
each of the seven dimensions are presented in Table 1. As is apparent 
in the table, nearly all of the children correctly viewed mood and fa-
tigue as memory-relevant factors, whereas judgments regarding fear 
were less accurate. 
Statistica l analyses of the trends in Table 1 revealed that signifi-
cantly more children recognized that memorization would be easier 
when happy than sad, ;(2(1) = 4.16, P < .05, and when alert rather 
than tired, X2(1) = 9.87, P < .01. It was not the case, however, that 
most children correctly viewed fear as a memory-relevant variable, 
;(2(2) = .25, P < .80. In fact, children split evenly in suggesting that 
memorization would be easier when not afraid than when fearful. In 
accord wi th previous findings (Wellman, 1977, 1978), most children 
indicated that learning would be easier w ith few rather than many 
items, ;(2( 1) = 4.16, P < .05, and in a quiet rather than a noisy room, 
X2( 1) = 11 .6, P < .01. That subjects chose few rather than many 
items demonstrates that they were not just choosing the posit ive ex-
emplar w ithin each pair. Less accurate judgments were obtained for 
the irrelevant dimensions, w ith children divided evenly in their 
choices for clothing, and w ith most children suggesting that fat peo-
ple would have a more difficult time memorizing than would thin 
people, ;(2(1) = 3.86, P < .05 . 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
Although the results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that young 
children recognize that mood and fatigue influence learning, a second 
important issue was whether they monitor their own internal states in 
terms of these two factors. To our knowledge, no one has investi -
gated preschool children's self-monitoring of physical or emotional 
states. Certainly, parental reports of exhausted preschoolers resisting 
bedtime suggest that such monitoring is not widespread. Alternately, 
research reviewed earlier (Cuitice et aI., 1983; Revelle et aI., 1985) 
suggests that cognitive monitoring by preschoolers does occur in 
other contexts. 
Because young children's monitoring of physi cal and emotional 
states has yet to be demonstrated, and because such internal experi-
ences have great impact on a range of cognitive behaviors (see Hill, 
1972; Masters et aI., 1979; Underwood, 1961 ), a second experiment 
was conducted. Its purpose was to determine whether preschoolers 
who are sad or fatigued monitor their internal states and more fre-
quently choose to defer the onset of a learning task than do those 
who are happy or less tired. 
Method 
Subjects. Forty-eight children between 3 and 5 years of age 
(mean CA = 50.4 months, 50 = 7.7 months) served as subjects. Each 
was enrolled in the Child Study Center at the University of Maine or 
in a local daycare center. None of the subjects had participated in 
previous research of this type. 
Task and conditions. The task involved providing children with 
the opportunity to learn the words and movements to a new finger-
game (Tap at the Door), either immediately or after a delay period. 
Just prior to making this decision, the children experienced one of 
four independent conditions designed to establish a high versus low 
level of fatigue or a happy versus sad emotional state. 
Stair climbing provided the basis for varying fatigue. In the high 
fatigue condition, children accompanied an experimenter up and 
down four full fl ights of stairs (composed of 66 steps and one wheel-
chair ramp) in order to feed a pet pigeon that was housed on the top 
floor of their preschool building. Each child also carried a 6-pound 
bucket of bird feed to make the task more tiring. By contrast, those 
children assigned to the low fatigue condition merely carried an 
empty bucket while accompanying the experimenter to a room adja-
cent to their classroom in order to feed the bird, that is, they climbed 
no stairs and engaged in no apparent strenuous activity. 
Two add itional conditions were designed to establish either a sad 
or a happy emotional state in the children. The verbal mood induc-
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tion procedure used by Moore, Underwood, and Rosenhan (l 973) 
was employed for this purpose. For a period of 60-s, children in the 
happy condition described and thought about things that made them 
very happy, whereas those in the sad treatment thought about and 
described sad things. 
Tes ting procedure. For the fatigue manipulation, 24 children 
were taken individually from their classroom and invited to help feed 
the school's new pet pigeon. They were randomly assigned to either 
the high or low fa tigue condition and then they accompanied the ex-
perimenter as he or she directed feeding. Using a yoked-control pro-
ced ure, children in the two conditions were matched on the amount 
of time spent wi th the experimenter prior to making the immediate/ 
deferred learning choice. To occupy the time that fatigued subjects 
spent climbing stairs, children in the low-fat igue condition helped the 
experimenter wash and dry the pigeon's food dish before feeding the 
bird. Following feeding, children in both groups returned to the en-
trance of their classroom and were to ld they needed to learn the 
movements to the finger game for future group activit ies in their 
schoo l. (Finger games comprised a normal part of the children's music 
curriculum.) Then they were asked if they wanted to learn the move-
ments " now or do you want to wa it until later?" Each child was also 
asked to justify his or her choice verbally; hidden microphones re-
corded all responses. 
The remaining 24 children were randomly assigned to one of the 
two mood induction treatments. Children were tested ind ividually in 
a research area near their classroom. During mood induction, if a 
child strayed from relating the required positive or negative content, 
he or she was reminded to talk only about sad or happy things. Imme-
diately following mood induction, each child was given the choice of 
lea rning the finger game right away or later, w ith thei r rationales for 
either choice tape recorded for later analysis. 
Results and Discussion 
Fa tigue conditions. Children in the fa tigue conditions spent 
about 7 min (M = 6 min, 54 s) with the experim enter prior to making 
their lea rning choices. Although no independent assessment of fa-
tigue level was taken, 6 of the 12 subjects in the high fatigue condi -
tion spontaneously made statements such as " These sure are long 
stairs," " Th is bucket is getting heavy," or " I'm getting tired," as they 
accompanied the experimenter up and down the stairs. 
The major dependent measure was the number of subjects who 
chose immediate versus delayed learning. Tabulati on revea led that 
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none of the non fa tigued preschoolers chose a delayed learning expe-
rience, whereas 58% of the fatigued sample (i.e., 7 children) deferred 
learning. This difference represents a significant condition effect. X'( 1) 
~ 9.88, P < .01. Because subjects in the two conditions presumably 
differed only in terms of their level of fa tigue, the finding demon-
st rates that young children self-monitor their own physica l states and 
al ter future behavioral choices accordingly. To our knowledge, this is 
the first report of its type with children who are this young. 
Inspection of the children's explanati ons for their choices re-
vealed that four of the seven subjects who made delayed choices al-
luded to fa tigue as a bas is for their decision (e.g., " I'm just too tired 
right now"). The remaining children offered uninformative justi fica-
tions (e.g., " I don't know," " I just want to"). 
Emotional state conditions. Contrary to expectations, all of the 
children who experienced sad mood induction chose the immediate 
learning alternative, as d id all but one of the children in the happy 
condi tion. Hence, no evidence was obtained that suggested the pre-
schoolers monitored their emotional states. Verbal just ifications for 
these choices were generally uninformative. Moreover, the content of 
some of the experiences related as sad during mood induction did not 
always seem negative in tone. Thus, it is unclear how different the 
two conditions rea lly were at the end of mood induction. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Although findings from Experiment 1 indicate that preschoolers 
recognize that fatigue can retard lea rn ing in others, and although re-
sults from Experiment 2 suggest that young children monitor their 
own physica l states and alter their subsequent behavior accordingly, 
neither data set unequivocally demonstrates that preschool children 
who are tired base learn ing deferrals on an awareness that fa tigue re-
tards memorization. Although the deferral data, in our judgment, 
strongly suggest the occurrence of cognitive monitoring, it is possible 
that young ch ildren may be used to resting whenever they rea lize that 
they are tired, regardless of whether a learning task is pending. 
To explore further whether children's metacognit ive knowledge 
predisposes differential learning choices under different levels of fa-
tigue, a third experiment was conducted. Its design was similar to the 
previous study except that recognition questions, which tapped po-
tential awareness of the relation between fat igue and learning, were 
ad ministered. In add ition, a more thorough evaluation of physical 
state was included to ensure that the two groups of children actually 
differed in their level of fa tigue. 
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Subjects. Parti cipants were 24 children between 4 and 5 years 
of age (mean CA = 53.4 months, SO = 4.7 months) . The children 
were enrolled in the Child Study Center at the University of M aine, 
and none had participated previously in research of this type. 
Ma terials and task. Because the Child Study Center moved to a 
new one-story building between Experiments 2 and 3, an alternate 
method of inducing fatigue had to be developed. An exercise record, 
" Go You Chicken Fat, Go," was selected for use. The record con-
tained li vely music, w ith an animated narrator verbally directing a se-
quence of vigorous exercises (e.g., running in place, knee bends). In 
previous years, the record had been used as a large-group activity in 
the Center and preschoo lers had commented about feeling tired after 
completing its exercises. 
Testing procedure. Children individually accompanied a re-
search assistant to a testing area and were aSSigned randomly to a fa-
tigue or a nonfa tigue condition. As a check on fatigue level (see 
Wade, Janke, Stern, & Lipsitt, 196 1), the pulse rate of all subjects was 
measured both pri or to and after the fo llowing interpolated activities. 
Children in the fa tigue treatment completed the exercises directed by 
the Chicken Fat record. Nonfatigued children merely listened to the 
Ch icken Fat record, while they helped the experimenter put away a 
group of light-weight, plastic blocks. 
Immediately after the interpolated acti vity (and as they were hav-
ing their pulse remeasured), children were asked if they fe lt tired. 
They were told then that they needed to learn a nursery rhyme for a 
large-group activity to be held in school on the following day. They 
were asked, " Do you want to learn it now or do you want to learn it 
later?" Those who requested deferred learning then were asked if 
they wanted to wait " because it's hard to learn when you are tired 
(not tired) or because you need to rest?" Those subjects who re-
quested immediate learning were asked if they wanted to learn the 
poem " now because it's easy to learn when you are not tired (tired) 
or so you won' t have to do it later?" Alternati ves w ithin each question 
were administered in a counterbalanced manner across subjects. As 
in Experiment 2, the amount of time spent w ith the experim enter 
prior to selecting a learning session was matched between the two 
conditions. 
Results and Discussion 
Physical state analyses. When asked, all 12 children in the fatigue 
cond ition said they were tired at the end of the exercise session, 
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whereas none of the non fatigued subjects said they were tired. More-
over, subjects in the fatigue condit ion showed an increase in pulse 
rate from preexercise (M ~ 89.2) to postexercise (M ~ 104.3). This 
increase was in contrast to the relatively constant pretest (M ~ 87.8) 
to posllest (M ~ 87.0) pulse rate observed in the non fatigue condi-
tion. The postactivity pu lse rate differed significantly, 1(11) ~ 8.52, P 
< .01, between the two treatments. Hence, both the verbal report 
and the physiological measure of fatigue suggest that the children in 
the high-exercise condition were more tired than those in the nonex-
ercise group. 
Monitoring analyses. In their learning choices, 8 of the 12 fatigue-
condition subjects chose delayed learning, whereas on ly 1 of the 12 
nonfatigued children did so. As in Experiment 2, this condition differ-
ence in choice type was significant, X2(1) ~ 8.67, P < .05, indicating 
that children may monitor their physical states and alter their behav-
ior accordingly. 
Metacognitive analyses. Of the 8 fatigued ch ildren who chose 
delayed learning, 88% (i .e., 7 subjects) justified their choice by indi-
cating that it is difficult to learn while tired. A one-tailed binomial test 
(p < .05) revealed this difference to be significant. That most of the 
fatigued children explained their choice in terms of the re lation be-
tween fatigue and learning is in accord with the not ion that meta cog-
nitive knowledge, in conjunction with cognitive monitoring of fatigue, 
predisposed the greater frequency of deferred choices. Of the 11 
nonfatigued subjects who chose immediate learning, 0 said they just 
did not want to do it later, whereas 5 said they thought they would 
learn beller whi le not tired. This difference in choice selection was 
not significant (one-tailed binomial, p < .90) 
EXPERIMENT 4 
The results from Experiment 2 offer no evidence that preschool-
ers monitored their emotional states prior to scheduling the learning 
session. It is possible, however, that such monitoring did occur, but 
that the negative mood that was induced was not strong enough to 
warrant deferred learning. In short, the mood of the positive- versus 
negative-set ch ildren may not have differed greatly at the end of in-
duction . Because no secondary check on the polarity of affect was 
taken, this possibility could not be evaluated. It is also possible that 
children in the negative mood condition viewed the proposed learn-
ing experience as something that would be fun, and therefore se-
lected immediate learning in order to cheer themselves up. 
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Experim ent 4 was conducted to examine both of these possibili-
ties, as well as to re-examine whether cognitive monitoring of emo-
tional state occurs in young subjects. A more systematic technique for 
mood induction was developed and secondary checks on the emo-
tional state of subjects were included. As in Experiment 3, a recogni-
tion test was administered to eva luate the degree to which metacog-
nitive awareness of the relation between mood and learning might 
influence subjects' choices. 
Method 
Subjects. Twenty-four children between 4 and 5 years of age 
(mean CA ~ 55.6 months, SO ~ 5. 1 months) served as subjects. All 
were enrolled in the Child Study Center at the University of Maine, 
and none had participated previously in research of this type. 
Materials and task. A revised tech nique for mood induction was 
developed to ensure that the experience was predominantly positive 
or negat ive in tone. It involved presenting stories describing sad or 
happy events. A shortened version of The Tenth Good Thing About 
Barney (Viorst, 1978), which describes a child's reaction to the death 
of a cat, was used to induce a sad emotional state. In previous years, 
this book had been read during story time at the Child Study Center 
and many children had commented about how sad they felt about 
Barney. A story entitled, " The Happy Cat," which describes how 
much fun it is to own a pet, was written to evoke a good mood. The 
two stories were equated for length, with an approximate delivery 
time of 3.1 min. 
To minimize the role of verbal skill needed to describe emotional 
states, a recognition question (i.e., "Do you feel happy or sad?" ) was 
administered at the end of each story. Immediately thereafter, chil-
dren were told that they needed to learn thei r phone number as part 
of an ongoing Self-help Program in their school. They were given the 
choice of learning it " now" or " later. " Those who chose deferred 
learning then were asked if they w ished to delay learning because 
" it's hard to lea rn when you're sad (happy) or so you can do some-
thing that will make you happier?" Those who sa id they wanted to 
learn immediately were asked if they wanted to do so because " you' ll 
do a good job while you' re happy (sad) or so you don' t have to do it 
later?" For both situations, the order of offering al ternat ives was coun-
terbalanced across subjects . 
Tes ting procedure. Children were taken individually to a re-
search room and randomly assigned to either the sad or happy story 
condition. As an add itional check on emotional state, children's facial 
expressions were videotaped through a one-way mirror while each 
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story was read. The experimenter had been trained to read the story 
in ei ther a gay and cheerful manner or in a somber and melancholy 
style. The experimenter was well practiced, so that reading time was 
equivalent across the two conditions. A live recitation was chosen in 
preference to a tape recorded one to better maintain subjects' atten-
tion. Following each rendition, the questions described earlier were 
asked. Q uestions were repeated as necessary to ensure that children 
understood each alternative. 
Tape analysis. To determine whether children differed in emo-
tional state just prior to learning, two independent coders used a 
modified version of the Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth (1971) tech-
nique for rating the affective content of facial expression from the vid-
eotapes. The ratings were based on facial expression during the last 
30 s of mood induction for each subject. As described by Ekman et al. 
(1971), emotional state was judged in terms of the intensity of expres-
sion and frequency of occurrence during the rating period. Ratings 
were made on a 5-point scale, with category labels of very happy (5), 
happy, (4), neutral (3) , sad (2), and very sad (1). For each subject, one 
overall rating for the entire 30-s period was generated by each coder. 
Both of the coders were naive regard ing the subjects' cond ition as-
signment, as well as the purpose of the study. Intercoder agreement, 
as measured by Cohen's Kappa, was .79 and .84 for the sad and 
happy conditions, respectively. 
Results and Discussion 
Emotional state analyses. The mean overall ratings of facial ex-
pression were 4.27 and 1.66 for subjects in the happy and sad condi-
tions, respect ively. These scores represent a signifi cant condition dif-
ferences in rated mood, 1(22) = 9.96, P < .01. When asked, all of the 
children in the happy condition sa id they felt happy and 9 of those in 
the sad treatment said they felt sad. Two of the remaining subjects 
said they did not know how they felt and the other subject sa id she 
felt " okay." Overall, the induction procedure appears to have had the 
intended effects on emotional state. ' 
Monitoring analyses. When asked when they would prefer to 
learn their telephone number, 9 children in the happy condition re-
quested immediate learning, whereas the remaining 3 children chose 
a delayed session. This trend was reversed in the sad condition, wi th 
2 ch ildren requesting immediate learning and 10 subjects chOOSing 
a delayed session. This condition difference was significant, X2( 1) 
= 6.04, P < .05, indicating that (with a stronger method of mood in -
duction than that used in Experiment 2) emotional state does influ -
ence young children's preferences for when a learning session should 
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begin. Most importantly, these data indicate that preschool children 
may monitor their emotional states and adjust subsequent behavior as 
a result of that process. 
Metacognitive analyses. In response to the fOllow-up quest ions, 
8 of the 9 happy subjects who chose immediate learning (i.e., 89%) 
sa id they did so because they thought they would do a good job 
wh ile happy. The remaining happy child sa id he picked immediate 
learning so he would not have to do the task later, which a one-tailed 
binomial test revea led to reflect a significant difference (p < .02). This 
justi ficati on of the predominate choice made by happy subjects is in 
accord with the notion that metacognitive knowledge influenced 
their behavior. 
For those children who chose deferred learning, 6 of the 10 sad 
subjects justified their choice on the grounds that it is hard to learn 
while sad. The remaining four subjects said they wanted to do some-
thing that made them happier. Although in the predicted direction, 
this difference is not significant (one-tailed binomial, p < .90). 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Two general conclusions are supported by the findings of these 
studies. Fi rst, it appears that children as young as 3 possess metacog-
nitive awareness that internal states representing fa tigue and mood 
can affect the ease w ith wh ich new information is acquired. Second, 
the data are consistent w ith the notion that young children monitor 
their own phys ica l and emotional states, and then make decisions for 
future activities based on the outcome of that monitoring process. To 
our knowledge, none of these findings have been reported previ-
ously. 
As demonstrated in Experiment 1, preschoolers not only recog-
nized that mood and level of fatigue in fluence learn ing, but also cor-
rect ly indicated the component of each factor (e.g., sadness vs. hap-
piness) that is associated w ith most effi cient memorization . Because 
transient states represent a category of information in the Flavell 
(198 1) model of metacognitive development, these find ings add to 
the store of such knowledge that young children appear to possess. 
The children's recognition that mood and fatigue influence learn-
ing also fits well w ith a notion proposed by Wellman (1977) in expla-
nati on of why certain factors are perceived as memory- relevant be-
fore others. Basica lly, Wellman has suggested that children become 
fa miliar with the effects of certain variables in nonlearning situations, 
then use that understanding to mediate metamnemonic judgments. 
Presumably, children become familiar w ith the effects of fatigue and 
sadness ea rly in li fe, encountering fatigue on a nightly basis. Several 
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invest igators (Borke, 1971; Poche, Brouwer, & Swearinger, 1981) sug-
gested that young children may experience fear less freq uently than 
other emot ions and, as a consequence, they are less aware of its gen-
eral effects. Such differences in familiarity may explain why fear" un-
like mood and fatigue, was not perceived as a memory-relevant factor 
in Experim ent 1. 
For the behavioral measures, the results of Experiments 2, 3, and 
4 demonstrated that preschoolers chose to defer their own learning 
w hen tired or sad, which suggests self-monitoring of transient states. It 
is difficult for us to posit mechanisms other than self-monitoring that 
could have produced the condition differences in deferred lea rning, 
given that, even after random ass ignment to conditions, subjects were 
matched on a number of potentially confounding variables (e.g., 
amount of time spent with the experim enter, the general nature of in-
terpolated activ ity, background music w ithin the exercise context). 
Something predisposed ch ildren to behave differently in the various 
cond itions, w hich di ffered only in terms of the respective physical or 
emotional state that was induced. Our judgment is that children rec-
ognized fa tigue or sadness, and then altered their behavior accord-
ingly. Without such recogniti on (which presumably entailed some 
level. of monitoring), subjects would not have shown the diverging 
pattern of deferred-learning choices that was obtained. It is important 
to note that " performance" data of this type represents, according to 
Revelle, Wellman, and Karabenick (1985), strong evidence of moni -
toring in preschool ch ildren, because verbal-judgmental tasks typi-
cally involve levels of abstraction or casual attributions that are too 
difficult for young subjects. 
Revelle, Wellman, and Karabenick (1985) also suggested two ad-
ditional criteria that must be met to infer that monitoring has tran-
spired. The first is that the situation and materials used to assess its 
occurrence be familiar to the subjects tested. The other is that the 
dependent measure be capable of differentiating monitoring fro m 
other ongoing processes (e.g., attention seeking). Fortu itously, our 
data are strong on both points. Substantial care was taken in Experi-
ments 2, 3, and 4 to select learning materials and interpolated activi -
ti es that were highly similar to those normally encountered by the 
children (e.g., finger games similar to those used for their music tra in-
ing, exercise records actually used in past years to promote physical 
development, nursery rhymes to be learned for the day's large group 
activ ity) . In short, the data were collected in contexts and with materi-
als that were highly familiar to the children. Secondly, it is the differ-
ence in behavioral choices between conditions, not the occurrence 
of an ongoing activity, that provided the basis for inferring self-moni-
toring. Thus, because evidence of cognitive monitoring has not been 
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consistently reported with young children, findings from this investi-
gation help elucidate the range of contexts in which it does occur in 
young children. 
What is less clear from this research is the degree to which the 
condition differences in learning choices were based on metamne-
monic awareness of the relation between memorization and the ef-
fects of physical and emotional states. On the positive side, a majority 
of children in both Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 chose the metam-
nemonic alternative as their explanation for why they preferred de-
layed or immediate learning. This finding is in accord with the notion 
that comprehension of a metacognitive principle predisposed the be-
hav ioral choice. On the other hand, when given freedom to express 
knowledge of the relation between learning efficacy and physical or 
emotional state, only 4 of the 7 subjects who deferred learning in Ex-
periment 2 did so. Obtaining a justification of this type by means of 
an open-ended question may simply be too difficult for preschoolers, 
given their limitations in verbal skill. It is also possible, however, that 
the two-choice recognition format used in Experiments 3 and 4 may 
be " putting words in children' s mouths" by pointing out a relation 
that they had not previously considered. For th ese reasons, it remains 
unclear whether knowledge of the metamnemonic principle served 
as the major determinant of the behavioral choices obtained. Al-
though the children's responses to the recognition questions are con-
sistent w ith this notion that it did, replication of this finding with alter-
nate and multiple methodologies is needed before a firm conclusion 
on the issue can be drawn. For example, including a wider range of al-
ternati ves in the forced choice format (e.g. , " Because you don't feel 
like doing anything right now") might clarify whether children are 
rea ll y basing decisions on a metacognitive principle. Likewise, the 
ge nera lit y of the behavioral findings may warrant additional study, 
w ith consideration of whether similar processes occur under natural 
conditions (e.g., before bedtime, in the classroom). 
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